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Abstract. Many wearable devices identify themselves in a pervasive
way. But at the same time, people want to remain anonymous. Modeling
anonymity and unlinkability in identication protocols is a delicate issue.
In this paper, we revisit the privacy model from Asiacrypt 2007. We show
how to achieve forward-privacy (in the V07 sense) using an IND-CCA
secure cryptosystem with the PKC protocol. We review the impossibil-
ity result of strong privacy and the model extension from CANS 2012 to
reach strong privacy (in the OV12 sense) using the PKC protocol with
plaintext awareness. We also discuss on the simplied model from ES-
ORICS 2011 and achieve strong-privacy (in the HPVP11 sense) using
IND-CCA security only. Finally, we apply these results to add privacy
protection in distance bounding protocols.
1 Introduction
People wear more and more passive RFID devices, from identity documents or
credit cards to smart socks1. These devices typically identify with a traceable
ID number to whichever device trying to scan them. Clearly, this opens oppor-
tunities for malicious people to tracing people based on their ID or to check how
frequently they changed their socks.
Concretely, an RFID system denes a set of legitimate tags, readers, and a
communication protocol between a tag and a reader. Sometimes, the protocol
may also require the reader to communicate with a centralized (authority) server.
The input of the tag consists of an internal state (which may contain a certicate
and a tag-specic secret key). The private output of the tag may be a new state
(for stateful protocols). The input of the reader may contain a root certicate or
a database of the secret keys of legitimate tags. The private output of the reader
is the ID of the tag. So, the purpose of the RFID protocol is to identify the tag
to the reader. At the same time, the identication must be secure (i.e., it must
authenticate the tag). A typical secondary issue is that the protocol must keep
privacy. I.e., no adversary could infer any non-trivial information about the ID
of the tag from the protocol.
A typical example is the GSM protocol: a GSM phone holding a SIM card
identies for the rst time to the network cell in clear using its IMSI number. This
1 which tell when they stinks so that we can wash them and also how to pair them
again after washing.
tells the cell to which home network the SIM card belongs and how to get means
to open a secure communication channel with it. Once this is done, the cell gives
a pseudonym TMSI to the phone which will be used for the next identication.
The TMSI is renewed through the secure channel as often as required. Security
is based on symmetric cryptography. Privacy is clearly ineective for the rst
connection. Furthermore, active attacks can break the synchronization between
a phone and the cell, forcing the phone to identify in clear again. So, privacy
protection is very weak in this case.
One dicult task when dening privacy is to model the capabilities of the ad-
versary and his goal. In the early days of secure RFID protocols, some simple pro-
tocols were proposed with privacy protection [19,30,45]. These protocols assumed
the adversary could not corrupt legitimate tags to get their internal state. A step
further was made by the Ohkubo-Suzuki-Kinoshita protocol (OSK) [32,33] (see
also [17,34]) to model forward privacy, i.e., such that uncorrupted tags running
the protocol could not be identied in the future after they become corrupted.
An early model for RFID privacy was proposed by Avoine-Dysli-Oechslin [3,2].
Their, the adversary chooses two tags; one of them is drawn at random and they
must guess which one after interacting with this tag and the reader concurrently.
The model was later rened by Juels and Weis [25] by telling the adversary when
the reader succeeds to identify a legitimate tag. This information, which is the
result of the protocol, models a side-channel information that the adversary
could exploit.
The most complete privacy model (called the V07 model herein) appeared at
Asiacrypt 2007 [39]. It is based on simulation. Essentially, the adversary plays
with tags and readers concurrently. He species the distribution following which
tags are drawn. His goal is to infer some information about identities, but the
information must be non-trivial in the sense that it cannot be inferred by sim-
ulating the protocol messages. The V07 model denes a 2 4-matrix of privacy
levels, depending on whether the adversary has access to the result of the pro-
tocol (which are called narrow and wide adversaries), and depending on how
corruption is feasible. With no corruption, we have a weak adversary. With
corruption which can only happen at the end of the game, we have a forward
adversary (to address forward privacy). With corruption which destroy tags (i.e.,
the adversary can no longer play with a corrupted tag), we have a destructive
adversary. With corruption which happens with no such restriction, we have a
strong adversary. In [39], a secure RFID protocol protecting both narrow-strong
and wide-forward privacy was constructed based on a chosen-ciphertext-secure
(IND-CCA) cryptosystem. This protocol based on a cryptosystem is called PKC
herein. It was further shown that wide-weak privacy was achievable with just a
pseudorandom function (PRF).
In [39], it was proven that an RFID protocol could not oer at the same time
wide-destructive and narrow-strong privacy. In particular, wide-strong privacy is
impossible. The impossibility result was however quite technical, more showing
that the privacy denition was overly restrictive than showing a concrete impos-
sibility result. This made Ng et al. [31] propose the notion of wise adversary, i.e.,
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an adversary who does not ask questions for which he knows the answer. The
denition from [31] was not formal enough to be usable, but this made Oua and
Vaudenay [35] to rene the V07 model by letting the simulator know the input
of the adversary (so, know what answer the adversary expects). This model is
called the OV12 model herein. Then, they have shown that the PKC protocol is
wide-strong-private when the cryptosystem is further plaintext-aware (PA).
Finally, Hermans et al. [23] proposed another privacy model (called the
HPVP11 model herein) in which the game uses a left-or-right oracle and cor-
ruption is not made on anonymous tags. Surprisingly, this makes the notion of
\trivial information" obtained by adversaries easy to specify and allows to get
rid of the simulation. In addition, the PKC model is shown to be wide-strong
private in the HPVP11 sense with only IND-CCA (and not PA) security as an
assumption. This makes the model much more easy to use. However, it was
shown in [35] that the OV12 model is strictly stronger that the HPVP11 model
in the sense that we can construct a protocol being HPVP11-wide-strong-private
but not OV12-wide-strong-private. However, the proof that the protocol is not
OV12-private does not yield any convincing real privacy threat. So, the de-
nitions of the OV12 model may be too restrictive and the HPVP11 notion of
wide-strong privacy may certainly be enough.
With distance bounding (DB) protocols, the tag wants to prove its proximity
to the reader. There are symmetric DB protocols in which the tag and the reader
share a secret and public-key DB protocols in which the tag (and sometimes the
reader) has a public/private key pair to authenticate. Modeling security for DB
protocols is not easy.
The rst complete security models and provably secure protocols were in-
dependently proposed by Boureanu et al. [8,9,10,11,12] and by Fischlin and
Onete [18,20]. None of these protocols were optimal but by combining both
ideas we obtain the DBopt protocols [7,26]. In these protocols, the tag and the
reader must share a symmetric secret.
Regarding public-key DB protocols, the DBoptmodel was adapted for public-
key DB in [41,42,43]. Not many public-key DB protocols exist. We list them in
Table 1 with the known proven security/insecurity results (see [42,43] for details).
The table includes Man-in-the-Middle security (MiM), Distance Fraud (DF),
Distance Hijacking (DH), Collusion Fraud (CF), wide-Privacy (Privacy), and
wide-Strong Privacy (Strong Privacy). Note that DBPK-Log [15] is broken [4].
As we can see, only the HPO protocol and privDB [24,42] provide some form of
privacy. HPO [24] relies on ad-hoc assumptions. Futhermore, it does not provide
wide-strong privacy (as shown in [44]). So far, only privDB [42] provides wide-
strong privacy. We added in the table the eProProx protocol which is proposed
in this paper. It extends ProProx by providing wide-strong privacy.
2 The V07 Model and the OV12 Extension
We describe here the V07 model [39] and the OV12 extension [35], as presented
in [40]. The V07 model [39] from Asiacrypt 2007 follows up some joint work dur-
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Table 1. Existing Public-Key Distance Bounding Protocols
protocol MiM DF DH CF Privacy Strong privacy
Brands-Chaum [14] secure secure insecure insecure insecure insecure
DBPK-Log [15] insecure insecure insecure insecure
HPO [24] secure secure insecure secure insecure
GOR [21] secure secure insecure insecure insecure insecure
privDB [42] secure secure secure insecure secure secure
ProProx [43] secure secure secure secure insecure insecure
eProProx (this paper) secure secure secure secure secure secure
ing the MSc Thesis of Bocchetti [6]. The results were also announced in [38]. For
completeness, we also indicate that some extension with reader authentication
was proposed in [36] ... but with a few incorrect results as shown by Armknecht
et al. [1].
The V07 model considers a multiparty setting with a malicious adversary and
several concurrent honest tags and honest readers which can be activated by the
adversary. All readers are assumed to be front ends of a secure server which
contains a database. The communication from readers to the central database is
assumed to be secure. Although all tags are honest, some belong to the system
(these tags are sometimes called legitimate) and some do not. The adversary
can initiate the creation of new tags (in the system or not). He controls the
communications to every participants. Furthermore, the access to random tags
in practice is modelled by having the adversary being able to draw anonymous
tags with a chosen probability distribution.
RFID system. More concretely, there is an algorithm
SetupReader! (KS ;KP )
producing a key pair. The key KS is secret. It can be used by readers. The key
KP is public and used to create tags. Indeed, there is an algorithm
SetupTagKP (ID)! (data; S)
producing an initial state S for the tag and some data so that the entry (ID; data)
is inserted into the database when the tag is meant to belong to the system. In
addition to SetupReader and SetupTag, an RFID system species an interactive
protocol between a tag and a reader. The tag has as input its current state S and
as output a value S0 which becomes the new state of the tag. The reader has as
input KS and as output some value out. If out =?, we say that the identication
failed. Otherwise, out shall corresponds to the ID of the tag.
Game. In a game, after SetupReader was run, the adversary receives KP and
can access to an oracle
CreateTag(ID; b)
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which runs SetupTagKP (ID)! (data; S). Additionally, if b = 1, the oracle inserts
(ID; data) into the database. So, b = 1 means that the tag will be recognized as
belonging to the system but b = 0 can be used to create \foreign tags".
The adversary can also access to the
DrawTag(D)! (vtag1; b1; : : : ; vtagn; bn)
with a chosen distribution. This oracle draws a vector (ID1; : : : ; IDn) following
the chosen distribution D. If any tag IDi is already drawn or was not created,
the oracle returns ?. Otherwise, it denes some fresh random identiers vtagi
and sets bi to 1 if and only if IDi belongs to the system. Additionally, the oracle
adds the matching vtagi $ IDi in a private table T . So, the adversary can draw
anonymous tags with a chosen distribution and can see which tag belongs to the
system. This assumption is realistic as practical tags often leak their version,
manufacturer, and other information from which we can deduce what type of
tag it is. Clearly, the drawing oracle is such that a drawn tag cannot be drawn
again. However, the adversary can call a
Free(vtag)
oracle to free the anonymous tag vtag so that it can be drawn again.
As discussed in [36,35], the oracle Free must reset the temporary memory
of the anonymous tag before releasing it. This is in order to present protocol
sessions to span through several anonymous tag instances.
The adversary can call a
Launch! 
oracle which initiates a new reader session which can be called by the identier
.
The adversary can send messages to a launched reader  or to a drawn tag
vtag as long as it has not be freed. He can call
SendReader(m;)! m0
to send m to  and obtain the response m0 (if any). If the reader initiates the
interactive protocol and  did not start yet, m is empty. If  was not launched
or if the protocol terminated on the session , nothing is returned. He can call
SendTag(m; vtag)! m0
to send m to vtag and obtain the response m0 (if any). If the tag initiates the
interactive protocol and vtag did not start yet,m is empty. If vtag was not drawn,
or was freed, or if the protocol terminated on vtag, nothing is returned. A new
session may start with vtag by calling SendTag again.
The adversary may use a
Result()! x
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oracle which tells whether the reader protocol succeeded to identify a tag on
session . (So, x = 0 or 1.) If the adversary is narrow, this oracle cannot be
used. If the adversary is wide, no restriction applies on using this oracle.
Finally, the adversary may use a
Corrupt(vtag)! S
oracle which returns the current state of the anonymous tag vtag. As vtag can
only be accessed between the time it is drawn and the time it is freed, the oracle
returns nothing at any other time. If the adversary is weak, this oracle cannot
be used. If the adversary is forward, only further Corrupt queries can be made
after this oracle call but no other oracle can be used. If the adversary is strong,
no restriction applies on corruption.
Matching conversation. We say that two participants have a matching conver-
sation at a given time if the sequence of incoming/outgoing messages that they
have seen match and are well interleaved. I.e., if the protocol transcript seen by
one participant is of form
(t1; in1; out1); (t2; in2; out2); : : : (tn; inn; outn);
or (when the participant initiates the protocol)
(t1;?; out1); (t2; in2; out2); : : : (tn; inn; outn);
with t1 <    < tn (meaning that at time ti, the participant received ini and sent
outi), then the protocol transcript seen by the other participant must be
(t01;?; in1); (t02; out1; in2); : : : (t0n; outn 1; inn);
or
(t02; out1; in2); : : : (t
0
n; outn 1; inn);
respectively, for some t01; : : : ; t
0
n such that t
0
1 < t1 < t
0
2 <    < tn 1 < t0n < tn
(meaning that at time t0i, the participant received outi 1 and sent ini).
Correct system. The protocol is correct if for any game, whenever there is a
matching conversation between some vtag and some , if vtag was drawn by
DrawTag with the bit b, then, except with negligible probability, the output of
 is out =? if b = 0 and out = T (vtag) if b = 1.
Secure system. An RFID system is secure if for any game, except with negligible
probability, for all  which produced out = ID 6=?, there must exist vtag such
that T (vtag) = ID and either vtag has a matching conversation with  or vtag
was corrupted.
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Privacy. In the privacy game, the adversary A plays with the oracle. When
done, he receives the table T and produces a binary output. To identify the
trivial ways to output 1, we use a simulator based on a blinder B. A blinder sees
all oracle queries of the adversary (but cannot see the table T ) and simulates the
responses of the Launch, SendReader, SendTag, and Result oracles to A. When
A interacts with the blinded oracles (instead of the oracles directly), we denote
it by AB . A trivial way for A to output 1 is such that there exists B such that
AB outputs 1 with nearly the same probability as A. Intuitively, it means that
A learns nothing new from the protocol messages, as he could simulate them
by himself. A protocol is P -private if for any adversary A in the class P , there
exists a blinder B such that A and AB produce the same output except with
negligible probability. As an example of class P , we can consider all wide-strong
adversaries.
Impossibility of wide-strong privacy in the V07 model. To prove the impossi-
bility of wide-strong privacy by contradiction, we essentially have to make the
adversary play against the blinder. Let us assume that the protocol provides
wide-strong privacy. We consider a rst game in which the adversary creates a
legitimate tag ID1, draws ID1, and corrupts it to get its state S1. Then, he runs
on its own SetupTagKP (ID0) ! S0. Now, the adversary can simulate either tag
ID0 or tag ID1 using their state. So, he can ip a coin b, launch a reader session
 and simulate IDb to  using Sb. Finally, the adversary calls Result() and gives
it as an output. Clearly, correctness imposes that the result of  is b. Due to
privacy, there must exist a blinder B such that from the states of the two tags S0
and S1 and the messages from the tag IDb, then B can guess b. This means that
we can make a second game in which we create two tags in the system, corrupt
both of them to get their states S0 and S1, then draw one at random and play
with, and use B to infer which tag was drawn. This would identify the tag, but
there is no blinder to do so. So, there is a contradiction. The crucial point in this
argument is that the adversary in the rst game knows which tag he simulates
and makes the Result guess it. So, a blinder must simulate this guess.
V07 vs OV12. A big dierence between the V07 and OV12 models is that in
OV12, the blinder can use the view of the adversary as input. So, he can simulate
the internal computations of the adversary and somehow \read his thoughts".
This is an essential technique used with plaintext awareness (PA). Essentially,
whenever the adversary issues a ciphertext, we can use a plaintext extractor
on the view of the adversary to see what was encrypted. With the previous
impossibility result in the V07 model, we can see that now, in the rst game,
the blinder could now read the bit b from the thoughts of the adversary and
no longer need to guess it from the states and messages. So, the argument of
impossibility does not hold in the OV12 model.
There are also tricky issues about the DrawTag oracle when the number n of
tags to be drawn is not logarithmic. For instance, if n is linear, the vector spans
in a set of exponential size. So, the representation of the input distribution D
can be large. In [35], it is specied that D is submitted in the form of an ecient
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sampling algorithm Samp. It is required that D must additionally be inverse-
samplable, i.e., there exists an ecient algorithm Samp 1 such that (; Samp())
and (Samp 1(x); x) are indistinguishable. (This is always the case when n is
logarithmic.) Furthermore, [35] requires that there exists a simulator S such
that the pair (ViewA; T ) consisting of the view of the adversary and the table T
is indistinguishable from the pair (ViewA; S(ViewA)). This is used to reconstruct
some possible random coins which are used in the privacy game so that we can
feed the plaintext extractor of the PA game (see [35]).
PKC protocol. The PKC RFID system is pretty simple. First, SetupReader sets
up a key pair (sk; pk) using Gen for a public-key cryptosystem (Gen;Encpk,Decsk).
We have KS = sk and KP = pk. Then, SetupTag picks a random KID and sets
up the state S = (pk; ID;KID) and data = KID to be inserted in the database.
Then, in the identication protocol, the reader selects a nonce N , sends it to the
tag. The tag then encrypts his ID, his key KID and the nonce N and sends the
ciphertext to the reader. The reader can then decrypt, check that the nonce is
correct, and that (ID;KID) is in the database.
A variant based on a PRF avoids using a database: we add a generation of
a secret KM for a PRF by SetupReader (so KS = (sk;KM )) and use KID =
PRFKM (ID).
In [39], it was proven that if the cryptosystem is IND-CCA secure then the
PKC protocol is correct, secure, wide-forward private, and narrow-strong private
in the V07 model. In [35], it was proven that if the cryptosystem is further PA (in
the PA1+ sense [16] or the PA2 sense [5]), then the PKC protocol is wide-strong
private in the OV12 model.
IND-CCA security is necessary for the security of PKC. Clearly, it is essential
that the cryptosystem is IND-CCA secure: without non-malleability, we could
loose security by forging the ciphertext of a legitimate tag. For instance, given
a secure cryptosystem (Gen; E;D), dening a malleable yet IND-CPA secure
cryptosystem Encpk(IDkKIDkN) = Epk(IDkKID)kEpk(N) would allow to take
Encpk(IDkKID) as a reusable credential to be use with any fresh nonce. Hence,
we could impersonate a legitimate tag.
IND-CCA security is insucient for the wide-strong privacy of PKC in the
OV12 sense. In [35], it was further proven that IND-CCA security was not
sucient to achieve wide-strong privacy. To prove this, the authors essentially
construct a cryptosystem which is IND-CCA secure but not PA. More con-
cretely, if (G0; E0; D0) is an IND-CCA cryptosystem and if (G1; E1; D1) is a
homomorphic IND-CPA cryptosystem over the message space f0; 1g such as the
Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [22], we dene
Gen! ((sk0; sk1); (pk0; pk1; z)) for
8>><>>:
G0 ! (sk0; pk0)
G1 ! (sk1; pk1)
 2U f0; 1g
z = E1pk1()
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Tag Reader
S = (pk; ID;KID) sk
database = f: : : ; (ID;KID); : : :g
N            pick N
e = Encpk(IDkKIDkN) e          ! parse Decsk(e) = (IDkKkN 0)
check N = N 0
check (ID;K) 2 database
output: ID
Fig. 1. The PKC Protocol based on a Cryptosystem Enc/Dec.
(note that  is discarded and never used again) and
Enc(pk0;pk1);z(m1   mn) = E0pk0(E1pk1(m1)k    kE1pk1(mn))
where the mi are bits. We can show that (Gen;Enc;Dec) is an IND-CCA-secure
cryptosystem. Then, we mount a wide-strong adversary who creates a legiti-
mate tag, corrupts it, then simulate it to the reader, except that the encryption
of (ID;KID; N) = m1   mn is modied as follows: after computing E1(mi) to
encrypt each bit of the plaintext, he multiplies them by z. Finally,
e = E0pk0(z  E1pk1(m1)k    kz  E1pk1(mn))
Clearly, the decryption of e by the reader is unchanged if and only if  = 0.
Otherwise, all bits are ipped and lead to an incorrect nonce, so the protocol
fails. As the adversary gets Result() from the reader, this bit is thus equal
to 1  . Although the blinder knows how the ciphertext was forged, he cannot
compute  when (G1; E1; D1) is secure. So, no blinder can simulate the Result()
oracle and we do not have wide-strong privacy.
Public-key cryptography is necessary. We can similarly show that a wide-strong
private RFID system can dene a public-key cryptosystem. So, it is unlikely that
we could construct one based on symmetric cryptography only. More concretely,
if we create two tags ID0 and ID1 then corrupt both of them, their state is
equivalent to a public key. Alice could send a bit b to Bob by simulating IDb
using the public key while Bob would simulate the reader with the secret key.
We can show that if the scheme is wide-strong private, then we have a public
cryptographic scheme in the sense of [37]. Hence, public-key cryptography is
necessary.
3 The HPVP11 Model
In [23], Hermans et al. proposed a quite simpler privacy model (the HPVP11
model herein).
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To dene the HPVP11 model, we revisit the oracle calls of the adversary. All
oracles work the same except CreateTag, DrawTag, and Corrupt. Namely,
CreateTag(ID)
always create a legitimate tag.
DrawTag(ID0; ID1)! vtag
draws either the tag ID0 (in the left world) or the tag ID1 (in the right world), and
returns a fresh identier vtag. It is not allowed to use as input an IDb which was
input of a previous DrawTag ! vtag such that vtag was not freed. In addition
to this,
Corrupt(ID)! S
now works on the true identity ID of the tag instead of the one of an anony-
mous tag, and it is not allowed if the corresponding tag was input of a previous
DrawTag and was not freed since then.2
The main dierence is that the game rst ips a coin b and uses the left
world for b = 0 and the right world for b = 1. The goal of the adversary is to
guess b. We have P -privacy if for any adversary in the class P , the probability
to correctly guess b is lower than 12 plus some negligible advantage.
Surprisingly, they even proved that based on IND-CCA security, the PKC
RFID system is wide-strong private in their model. Hence, our proof that IND-
CCA security is not sucient shows that the PKC protocol can be wide-strong
private in the HPVP11 sense but not in the OV12 sense. So, HPVP11 privacy
does not imply OV12 privacy. However, looking closer at what it means in prac-
tice, we can wonder to what extend the proof that IND-CCA security is not
enough for OV12 privacy implies any privacy threat. Indeed, the inability to
simulate the Result oracle in our counterexample does not seem to imply any
leakage in identifying information. So, HPVP11 privacy may be enough in prac-
tice.
4 Strong Privacy in Distance Bounding
In distance bounding (DB) protocols, the tag wants to prove its proximity to
the reader. There are several threat models. With honest tags, we have to face
to man-in-the-middle attacks (MiM) trying to make the reader accept a proof
of proximity although no tag is actually close. MiM-security is also called HP-
security (as for Honest Prover) in [41,43]. With malicious tags, we consider
distance fraud (DF), where no tag is close to the reader, distance hijacking (DH),
where a honest tag is close to the reader but the malicious one far away tries
to pass the protocol, and collusion fraud (CF), where the malicious tag can be
2 Some variants allow this but do not disclose states depending on possible ongoing
sessions (typically: the volatile memory). So, extra care must be taken with stateful
protocols.
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helped by a close-by malicious adversary. CF-resistance is formalized in [41,43]
in terms of soundness of the proximity proof: essentially, we show that if the
protocol succeeds, then we can extract the secret of the identied tag from the
view of participants which are close to the reader. So, there is no better CF
than the trivial one consisting of giving the secret of the tag to the close-by
adversary. In symmetric DB, the tag and the reader are assumed to share a
secret. In public-key DB, the tag holds a key pair but shares no secret with
the reader. In this paper, we concentrate on strong privacy. Since this requires
public-key cryptography (as already mentioned), there is no need for limiting
ourselves to symmetric DB. So, we only consider public-key DB.
Privacy in public-key DB. The rst public-key DB protocol to oer privacy is
the HPO protocol [24]. However, it does not oer strong privacy [44]. In [13],
it was suggested to transform a symmetric DB protocol into a public-key DB
protocol using a key agreement protocol. We can wonder how privacy can be
preserved. The rst concrete example is the privDB protocol [42]. It is depicted
on Fig. 2 (taken from [42]). There, symDB denotes a one-time symmetric DB
protocol (such as OTDB on Fig 3). We use a signature scheme Sign/Verify and a
cryptosystem Enc/Dec. The function Validate(pk) is used to \validate" a public
key, i.e. either to check that it belongs to a database, or to check a certicate
(which could be pk itself).
Reader Tag
secret key: skR secret key: skT
public key: pkR public key: pkT
pick N
N             ! pick s,  = SignskT (N)
skpkk = DecskR (e)
e               e = EncpkR (skpkT k)
Verifypk(;N) and Validate(pk)
symDB(s)             !
output: pk
Fig. 2. privDB: Private Public-Key DB [42].
In public-key DB, the tag has a key pair (sk; pk) and the public key KP
of the system. We modify the PKC protocol as follows: instead of encrypting
IDkKIDkN , we now encrypt skpkkSignsk(N) where s is a random key. Then, the
reader no longer needs the secret of the tag. The identity is obtained by pk and
it is enough to authenticate the tag using the signature on N . The value s can
further be used as the result of a key agreement. Hence, the tag and the reader
can now use s to run a symmetric DB protocol. This is the principle of the
privDB protocol [42] which is wide-strong private (in the HPVP11 sense) and
secure DB3.
3 More precisely, it defeats distance fraud, man-in-the-middle attacks, and distance
hijacking, but not collusion fraud, as shown on Table 1.
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Reader Tag
secret key: s secret key: s
initialization phase
pick m 2 f0; 1g2n m             ! a = sm
challenge phase
for i = 1 to n
pick ci 2 f0; 1g, start timeri
ci=============)
stop timeri
ri(============= ri = a2i+ci 1
verication phase
a = sm
check timeri  2B, ri = a2i+ci 1
Fig. 3. OTDB: One-Time Symmetric DB [42].
Strengthening ProProx. We recall on Fig. 4 [43] a (simplied) version of ProProx.
There, we use a homomorphic bit commitment scheme Com such that
Com(b; ) = b2
in a group such that 2 = 1 and  has no square root, and a deterministic vector
commitment scheme
ComH(sk) = (Com(sk1;H(sk; 1)); : : : ;Com(sks;H(sk; s)))
There is no required assumption on the hash function H except that ComH must
be one-way. This is the case when H is a random oracle (and sk is not too small),
but H does not necessarily need to be a random oracle in this construction. We
also use a zero-knowledge proof ZKP(zi;j ; i;j) that there exists some i;j such
that zi;j = 
2
i;j for all i; j. We can use parallel instances of the protocol from
Fig. 5 [43] with enough challenges to that the soundness probability is . There,
we use a trapdoor commitment scheme (Gen;Commit;Equiv).
As shown on Table 1, ProProx is the only public-key DB protocol with full
security. However, it does not protect privacy. We can extend ProProx into a
protocol eProProx as shown on Fig. 6 to add privacy protection. If ProProxH(pk)
denotes the protocol from Fig. 4, we just change the function H (as used by
the tag) into a function H 0 and the public key pk (as used by the reader) into
pk0. Essentially, we blind the public key of the tag so that it does not leak from
ZKP. Interestingly, the encryption step in this extension is similar to the PKC
protocol from Fig. 1. We can indeed use this encrypted channel to identify by
transmitting pk: now, pk is given as an output of the reader instead as an input.
We state the security results for eProProx as they are stated for ProProx
in [43]. We however simplied it (in more details, we took pnoise = 0 and  = n).
Theorem 1. The eProProx protocol is a sound, MiM-secure, DF-resistant, and
DH-resistant proof of proximity under the assumption that
{ Com is a perfectly binding, computationally hiding, and homomorphic bit
commitment;
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Reader Tag
public: pk pk = ComH(sk) secret: sk
initialization phase
for i = 1 to n and j = 1 to s
pick ai;j 2 Z2, i;j
Ai;j                     Ai;j = Com(ai;j ; i;j)
challenge phase
for i = 1 to n and j = 1 to s
pick ci;j 2 Z2
start timeri;j
ci;j
====================) receive c0i;j
receive ri;j , stop timeri;j
r0i;j(==================== r0i;j = ai;j + c0i;jbi;j + c0i;jskj
verication phase
check timeri;j  2B for all i; j
zi;j = Ai;j

bi;j pkj
ci;j
 ri;j
ZKP(zi;j :i;j ;i;j)                   ! i;j = i;jH(sk; j)c
0
i;j
Fig. 4. ProProx: Sound Public-Key DB [43].
Verier Prover
public: z z = 2 secret: 
prm               generate td, prm = Gen(td)
pick e 2 Z2, pick r
Commitprm(e;r)             !
h               pick g, h = g2
e;r             ! check commitment
check hze = `2, prm = Gen(td)
`;td               ` = ge
Fig. 5. ZKP(z : ): a Zero-Knowledge Proof of Existence of  such that z = 2 [43].
Reader Tag
secret key: skR secret key: skT
public key: pkR public key: pkT
pick  = (1; : : : ; s)
kpk = DecskR (B)
B                     B = EncpkR (kpkT )
pk0j = pkjCom(0; j) H
0(:; j) = H(:; j)j
ProProx
H0 (pk
0)                   !
output: pk
Fig. 6. eProProx: a Privacy Extension for ProProx.
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{ ComH is one-way;
{ ZKP is a complete and -sound computationally zero-knowledge proof of
membership for  = negl.
Proof. Since the cryptosystem plays no role in the security, we assume without
loss of generality that kpkT is sent in clear in B. We let  0 be a security game.
We make a new game  1 which rst picks one tag pk at random and succeeds in
this is the tag which is identied in the attack. So, the target pk is given rst. If
this game succeeds with negligible probability, then  0 succeeds with negligible
probability as well. So, we can concentrate on  1.
Reader sessions who do not receive pk in B can just be simulated by the
adversary without aecting the success probability. So, we obtain a new game
 2 in which all readers are dedicated to pk.
Since the adversary knows , he knows the multiplicative factors to change
pkj into pk
0
j in each zi;j and H(sk; j) into H
0(sk; j) in each i;j . So, we can
construct an adversary against ProProxH(pk). Then, we apply the security results
from [41,43]. ut
Theorem 2. The eProProx protocol is wide-strong private in the HPVP11 sense
under the assumption that
{ Enc/Dec is an IND-CCA-secure cryptosystem;
{ Com is a computationally hiding homomorphic bit commitment;
{ ZKP is a computationally zero-knowledge proof of membership.
Proof. We consider the HPVP11 game  0. Without loss of generality, we assume
that drawn tags run a single session of the protocol (indeed, they can be freed
and drawn again to run more sessions).
We rst reduce to a game in which no dierent tag sessions pick the same
 vector. So, they never produce the same B, due to the correctness of the
cryptosystem. We obtain a game  1 producing the same output as  0, except
with negligible probability.
We observe that in the privacy game, the output pk on the reader side plays
no role and that the reader only needs pk0 to run ProProxH0(pk0). Namely, 
and H 0 are of no use to the reader. So, we can change the protocol by having
the reader saying to the adversary whether pk is a valid key, returning pk0,
and stopping. Then, the reader messages as in  1 can be fully simulated by
the adversary. We obtain a game  2 in which the reader is only decrypting B,
checking pk, computing pk0, and releasing it.
Next, we change the game by making sure that if a session  receives B which
was previously issued by one vtag after encrypting some kpkT , then  does not
use the decryption algorithm but rather continues directly with  and pk = pkT .
Clearly, the simulation is perfect. We let  3 denote the new game.
Then, by using hybrids, we replace in  3 every B issued by vtag by the
encryption of some random junk string. Thanks to the IND-CCA security, we
obtain a new game  4 which produces the same output, except with negligible
probability. So, in  4, it is as if we had a protocol in which vtag has some perfectly
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secure channel to transmit  and pkT to  but the adversary can plug or unplug
this channel.
Then, we change again the protocol by having the tag to release pk0. It is
already known that pkT is valid. So, the adversary need not ask for it to the
reader. Hence, we can now suppress the private channel to the reader, then even
give skR to the adversary and completely get rid of the reader. We obtain a
privacy game  5 against a protocol in which there are only tags who rst pick
, compute pk0, release pk0, and run ProProxH0(pk0).
We now construct hybrid games of  5. The ith hybrid is using the right world
for the rst i   1 DrawTag queries and the left world for all queries starting
from the (i + 1)th one. Let vtag be the ith drawn tag. Note that vtag runs a
single session of the protocol. By giving the secret of all tags to the adversary,
we can get rid of all tags except vtag. We can then apply the zero-knowledge
property of ProProxH0(pk
0) [41,43] to simulate the view of the adversary and
produce the same output in the left or right world of the hybrid, except with
negligible probability, by only getting pk0 from vtag. Clearly, pk0 is just a random
commitment of sk. So, we can use the hiding property of Com to deduce that
the left and right worlds of the hybrid produce the same output except with
negligible probability.
So, the left and the right worlds of  5 are producing the same output except
with negligible probability. ut
5 Conclusion
As we have seen, we now have pretty mature privacy models for RFID and
protocols reaching their stronger avors. So far, these models fully cover unilat-
eral authenticated identication protocols, in which a tag identies to a reader.
These models could be enriched to cover other protocols: we could consider DB
protocols in which the tag is already identied, we could consider bilateral identi-
cation protocols, we could consider protocols with mutual authentication (such
as in [1,36]). In general, even if we do have a general model for elementary pro-
tocol, it is not clear that we could compose private elementary protocols for free.
More research must be done for composable privacy.
For completeness, we mention that we only discussed privacy related to iden-
tifying information. Some other forms of privacy are discussed in the literature,
such as the location privacy [27,28,29].
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